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Abstract. This paper defines and studies optimality in a dynamic stochas-
tic economy with finitely lived agents, and investigates the optimality proper-
ties of an equilibrium with or without sequentially complete markets. Various
Pareto optimality concepts are considered, including interim and ex ante op-
timality. We show that, at an equilibrium with a productive asset (land) and
sequentially complete markets, the intervention of a government may be jus-
tified, but only to improve risk sharing between generations. If markets are
incomplete, constrained interim optimality is investigated in two-period lived
OLG economies. We extend the optimality properties of an equilibrium with
land and examine conditions under which introducing a pay-as-you-go system
would not lead to any Pareto improvement upon an equilibrium.
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1 Introduction
Intergenerational transfers are of crucial importance, as illustrated by the cur-
rent debates on Social Security. Their theoretical analysis has been tackled
in risk-free economies with two period-lived overlapping generations (Samuel-
son [15], Gale [8], Diamond [7]). Two striking results have been shown. First,
a competitive equilibrium may be ineﬃcient. At a steady state equilibrium,
ineﬃciency is characterized by an interest rate less than the population growth,
which is associated with an overaccumulation of capital in a production econ-
omy. In such a situation, direct transfers from the young to the old agents, as
performed either by a pay as you go system or by a governmental debt, make
every generation better oﬀ, the current old included. Second, ineﬃciency is
ruled out at equilibrium if there exists a durable asset, land, that distributes
positive dividends at all dates. Our purpose is to study how such results extend
to stochastic economies with finitely lived agents. Endowments, land dividends,
and production are subject to shocks, and markets may be (sequentially) in-
complete. Risk sharing is then an important issue which may interact with
overaccumulation. Moreover, since rates of return are not equalized across dif-
ferent securities, it is unclear which rate should be compared with population
growth to assess eﬃciency.
To investigate eﬃciency issues, we focus on the Pareto concept, which takes
into account all the agents in the economy.2 In our stochastic set up, in which
diﬀerent events are possible before an agent’s birth, Pareto optimality may
however be defined in many diﬀerent ways. A first natural concept is interim
optimality, in which an agent’s utility level is evaluated in all the possible cir-
cumstances at his birth’s date, taking into account the available information at
that date. Intuitively, this concept is rather weak: since an agent’s utility level
is evaluated at birth, it does not account for the possibilities of insurance across
the events that may occur at that date. A second concept, ex ante optimal-
ity, by evaluating the agents’ welfare at the initial date, takes full account of
these insurance possibilities. More generally a family of Pareto concepts may
be defined according to the dates at which agents’ welfare is evaluated, and the
information available at those dates.
Given a Pareto concept and possibly some constraints on consumption plans,
we investigate necessary or suﬃcient conditions for optimality. To be optimal,
an allocation must be short run optimal: the agents born before a given date
cannot be made some better oﬀ and other at least as well oﬀ without chang-
ing the allocation of the agents born after that date (where agents’ welfare
is evaluated according to the chosen concept). Short run optimality however
is not suﬃcient for optimality. The usual approach, which yields the interest
rate condition (for a survey see Geanakoplos-Polemarchakis [9]), extends to our
2In risk-free economies, a weaker concept in which the utility levels of all but a finite
number of generations are considered, is sometimes used to evaluate ”long run situations”.
For example, in Samuelson model, any stationary allocation that is sustained by an interest
rate strictly above the population growth is Pareto optimal but not optimal in the long run:
a transition to the golden rule would make future generations better oﬀ but surely some
generations would suﬀer from the reform.
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stochastic economies with constraints on consumption plans but only under
appropriate convexity assumptions. Such assumptions ensure that a short run
optimal allocation is supported by at least one contingent value process (which
is the unique, up to a normalization, Arrow-Debreu supporting price process
if consumption plans are not constrained). A single condition guarantees the
optimality of a short run optimal allocation. Take the infimum, over all sup-
porting processes, of the expected present value of one unit of wealth for sure
at a future date t; the condition says that this infimum converges to zero when
t increases up to infinity.
We then investigate the optimality of an equilibrium with rational expec-
tations when a durable asset, land, is transacted, and possibly some financial
securites. Add the additional, and not innocuous, assumption of sequentially
complete markets. Using the above condition easily yields a clear-cut result:
whatever optimality concept, if an equilibrium with land is short run optimal,
then it is optimal as well. Accordingly, the main issue is short run optimality.
Recall that, with sequentially complete markets, each agent can fully insure
against the realization of the shocks that are realized after his birth and con-
ditionally on the state at his birth. Therefore, short run interim optimality is
guaranteed at equilibrium, and as a consequence optimality as well. This may
be a striking result since high fluctuations in land prices may occur at equi-
librium. Now, markets, even sequentially complete, do not allow for insurance
against the events at birth. If one is concerned with these risks, a stronger opti-
mality concept must be used, and short run optimality is not guaranteed at all.
From a positive point of view, under the stated assumptions, the intervention
of a government may be justified, but only to improve risk sharing between
generations.
If markets are not sequentially complete, the optimality properties of an
equilibrium are much more diﬃcult to study. Implementing some transfers in-
duces changes in the demand for the assets, hence their prices. If there is a long
lived asset such as land, the changes in its future prices aﬀect the sharing possi-
bilities, i.e. modifies the ”spanning”. As a result, the convexity of consumption
sets alluded above is not satisfied, so that a short run optimal allocation is typi-
cally not supported by a contingent value process, and the standard approach is
not helpful. We however obtain some positive results in two period life overlap-
ping generations economies. Keeping the financial securities payoﬀs fixed, we
examine whether an equilibrium can be Pareto improved upon, in the interim
sense, when these securities and the good can be reallocated among the young
agents before the exchanges. If no improvement is possible, the equilibrium is
”second best” or ”constrained” optimal, since the constraints imposed by the
incomplete market structure are taken into account. Two cases are considered,
with or without productive land.
If there is productive land, and no short sales on land, the results are clear:
equilibria are not comparable, or equivalently all are constrained interim opti-
mal : a planner cannot by appropriate reallocation improve strictly the situation
of some agents at birth without making some other worse oﬀ. Loosely speak-
ing, productive land is still, even without complete markets, an eﬃcient tool to
exchange goods over time among generations.
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Without productive land, another eﬃcient tool may be a pay-as-you-go sys-
tem, as is the case in risk-less Samuelson economies if the interest rate is less
than population growth. Introducing such a system in an incomplete asset
structure enlarges the spanning so again the standard approach is not helpful.
A simple condition, which bears on the returns of the financial securities, nev-
ertheless ensures that the autarkic equilibrium is constrained interim optimal,
meaning that no pay-as-you-go Social Security with pensions proportional to
past contributions, even coupled with reallocations of the securities, leads to a
Pareto improvement.
Whereas limited to a set up where agents live for two periods only, both
results suggest that if land is transacted or if a condition on financial returns
is satisfied, which is likely to be true in our economies, the source of Pareto
improvement should be found more on risk sharing considerations rather than
on positive transfers from the young to the old agents.
The literature on stochastic overlapping generation economies starts with
Muench [11], Peled [13], and Aiyagari-Peled [3], who consider stationary envi-
ronments, where shocks are described by an exogenous state variable. In this
set up, they focus on time invariant allocations, and characterize those which
are conditionally optimal, i.e. Pareto optimal among time invariant alloca-
tions. We show that conditional and interim optimality are closely related, and
that our results extend theirs to a more general set up. Demange-Laroque [6]
and Chattopadhyay-Gottardi [15] have also obtained similar results by diﬀerent
methods. Abel-Mankiw-Summers-Zeckhauser [1] provide a suﬃcient condition
for interim optimality in a two period lived representative generation model
and apply it to the United States. Theorem 4 extends their condition to an
economy without a representative agent nor sequentially complete markets. Fi-
nally another branch of the literature, Zilcha [16],[17], concentrates on capital
eﬃciency, independently of risk sharing considerations. The objective is to
check whether overaccumulation can be defined unambiguously, independently
of utility functions.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model. Section 3
defines optimality concepts, gives suﬃcient conditions for an allocation to be
optimal, and draws some comparisons with conditional optimality. Section 4
studies the optimality properties of a rational expectations equilibrium when
markets are sequentially complete. When markets are incomplete, the same
question is tackled in Section 5 in two period lived overlapping generations
economies. Proofs are gathered in section 6.
2 The Model
2.1 The economy
We consider an economy starting from date 0 up to infinity. In every period,
there is a single physical good which can be used for consumption and invest-
ment.
Agents. There is an infinity of agents who each one lives for a finite period of
time, which is uniformly bounded by some ` : agent i is born at date ti and dies
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at date Ti with Ti−ti+1 ≤ `. Agent i’s preferences over his lifetime consumption
ci = (ci,t, t = ti, ..., Ti) are represented by a Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility
function ui(ci). If agent i is alive at date 0 and was born before, his utility
levels are evaluated over consumption from date 0 on, taking past consumption
levels as given; it will be convenient to set ti equal to zero.
The whole set of agents is denoted by I and the subset of agents who are
born before t by It. The number of agents alive at a given date is assumed to
be uniformly bounded;3 moreover, to ensure some intertemporal trades, for any
two consecutive dates, there is at least one agent alive at both dates. A typical
example is an overlapping generations (OLG) model in which at each date a
new generation of M types agents is born and lives for ` periods; an agent is
then naturally indexed by his birth’s date and type.
Resources and production. At each date t, there are some aggregate re-
sources ωt on top of the returns from previous investment. The good can be
consumed or invested in a stochastic production technology : k units invested
at date t yield f(k, ρt+1) units at t+1 where ρt+1 is the shock realized at t+1.
The uncertainty. The economy is subject at each date t, t ≥ 1, to exogenous
shocks, which are described by a variable st. To avoid technical diﬃculties, the
stochastic process st is assumed to take its value in a finite fixed set S. A state of
the world 4 at t, st, is the sequence of realized shocks up to t : st = (s0, s1, ..., st),
where s0 includes all relevant information on the past. All the variables that
describe the economy such as endowments, productivity shocks, are functions
of these states. The transition probability of the process st is denoted by P :
P (st+1|st) gives the probability of st+1 given st.
Public information. The information on the state of the world that becomes
public is used by a ”planner” to evaluate the agents’ welfare. Information at
date t is described as usual by a partition of the set of states St : it is known to
which element ht of this partition the realized state st belongs; ht will be called
the history at time t. As usual, information is increasing, and the probability
distribution of the process ht is deduced from probability P . We shall denote
ht+1 Â ht if ht+1 is a history that follows ht with positive probability.
Assumptions Throughout the paper, we make the following assumptions :
- Inada conditions : ∂ui∂ci,t tends to infinity if ci,t tends to zero for t = ti, ..., Ti;
- the process ωt is strictly positive at all dates, and uniformly bounded
above: there is ω such that ωt ≤ ω any t.
- for any possible ρ, k → f(k, ρ) is defined for all k ≥ 0; it is null for
k = 0, nondecreasing, concave, diﬀerentiable, and ∂f(k,ρ)∂k ≤ r < 1 for any k
high enough, any ρ.
These assumptions are standard. They allow us to restrict attention on
interior and bounded allocations.5 Production is performed with nonincreasing
returns to scale, and may be null.
3This assumption precludes population growth but could be relaxed.
4A state of the world is sometimes called ”node” or ”date-event” in the literature since the
uncertainty may be described by a date-event tree.
5There is k such that f(k + ω, ρ) ≤ rk for any k ≥ k, any ρ. Whatever initial value, even
if the good is invested for sure at all dates, the returns get almost surely in finite time lower
than k. As a result, aggregate resources are bounded.
4
2.2 Allocations
We are interested in situations where an allocation that satisfies both measura-
bility and scarcity constraints is not necessarily feasible, due to lack of informa-
tion, constraints on financial securities and redistributive tools. To cope with
such situations, the set of agents’ consumption plans may be restricted.
Feasible consumption plans. A consumption plan for agent i is a stochastic
process ci = (ci,t), where ci,t is the random positive consumption of i at date
t, ti ≤ t ≤ Ti, where ci,t is measurable with respect to the fundamental states
st; accordingly ci,t may be written as (ci,t(s
t)). The whole set of unconstrained
i’s consumption plans will be denoted by Xi. Under constraints, the set of i’s
consumption plans is described by a subset Ci of Xi. Note that, since Ci is a
set of consumption plans, the constraints bear on life time consumption plans
and may depend on the state of the world.
An allocation c = (ci, i ∈ I), specifies the consumption plans for all agents.
Aggregate consumption at time t, denoted by ct, is equal to
P
i ci,t where i
runs over the agents who are alive at t. We are now able to define the feasible
allocations, given the constraints.
Definition 1 Given the collection of sets C = (Ci, i ∈ I), an allocation c =
(ci, i ∈ I) is C-feasible if ci ∈ Ci for all i, and the scarcity constraints are met
at every date, every state: There is a non negative process, kt, measurable with
respect to public information, starting at k−1 such that :
ct + kt = f(kt−1, ρt) + ωt for all t ≥ 0. (1)
Investment is assumed to be measurable with respect to public information,
for simplicity. This assumption could be easily modified.
2.3 Optimality concepts
Two considerations motivate our definitions. First, constraints have to be taken
into account : given the sets C, we only compare C-feasible allocations among
each others.6 Secondly, under uncertainty, an individual’s expected utility level
much depends on the date at which is evaluated, and on the available infor-
mation. As a consequence, various Pareto optimality concepts are obtained
according to the dates that are chosen to evaluate individuals’ welfare. Be-
fore giving a general definition, we spell out two special but prominent cases,
hereafter called interim and ex ante optimality.
Definition 2 A C-feasible allocation c is interim optimal if there is no other
C-feasible allocation c0 such that, for all i, all histories h at date ti :
E[ui(c
0
i)|h] ≥ E[ui(ci)|h],
with a strict inequality for at least one (i, h).
6This is similar to constrained eﬃciency such as considered in the incomplete markets
literature, for example in Geanakoplos-Polemarchakis [8].
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Agents’ utility levels are evaluated in all possible circumstances that may occur
at their birth’s date. Roughly speaking, to check the optimality of an allocation,
one needs to consider all possible paths that the economy may follow starting
from an initial situation, and looks whether it is possible to make some agents
better oﬀ and no one worse oﬀ along these paths. This concept may be thought
to be rather weak (see however the comments hereafter). Since it distinguishes
the same agent born in diﬀerent states, it does not account for the possibilities
of insurance across the events that may occur at that date. Ex ante optimality,
that we now define, takes full account of these insurance possibilities.
Definition 3 A C-feasible allocation c is ex ante optimal if there is no other
C-feasible allocation c0 such that, for all i :
E[ui(c
0
i)|h0] ≥ E[ui(ci)|h0],
with a strict inequality for at least one i.
Ex ante optimality implies interim optimality, and is much stronger indeed.
Actually ex ante optimality and interim optimality are the polar cases of a
family of concepts that we now define. Each concept is characterized by e =
(ei, i ∈ I), which gives the date ei, 0 ≤ ei ≤ ti, at which each agent i’s utility
level is evaluated.
Definition 4 Given e, a C-feasible allocation c is (e, C)-optimal if there is
no other C-feasible allocation c0 such that, for all i, all histories h at date ei :
E[ui(c
0
i)|h] ≥ E[ui(ci)|h],
with a strict inequality for at least one (i, h).
Interim and ex ante optimality correspond respectively to the cases where ei =
ti for all i, and ei = 0 for all i. The earlier the evaluation dates, the stronger the
concept since more insurance possibilities are taken into account. Note that, in
a deterministic set up, all concepts collapse to a single one, the usual Pareto
optimality concept applied to all agents, including those who were born before
date 0. Finally, if all the inequalities are satisfied, say in definition 2, we say
that c0 interim dominates c.
3 Conditions for optimality
To study optimality, it is tempting to consider an artificial economy where
agents are the pairs (i, h) in which h is a possible history at ei. This is pos-
sible since, thanks to the Von Neumann-Morgenstern assumption, i0s utility
level given h depends on a consumption plan only through its restriction to
the states that succeed h. Under appropriate assumptions, we provide some
necessary or suﬃcient conditions for optimality, by following similar arguments
as those previously developed in OLG models with certainty (for a survey see
Geanakoplos-Polemarchakis [9]).
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3.1 Short run optimality
Given an optimality concept, i.e. given evaluation dates e and setsC, optimality
requires short run optimality, which asserts that no reallocation among a finite
set of agents can improve their situation. Equivalently, the agents who are born
before some date t, i.e. members of It, cannot be made all not worse oﬀ and
some better oﬀ without modifying the consumption plans of some agents who
are born after t :
A C-feasible allocation c = (ci) is (e,C)-optimal for It, if there is no C-feasible
c0 = (c0i) such that
1. for any i in It, for any h at date ei: E[ui(c0i)|h] ≥ E[ui(ci)|h], with a
strict inequality for at least one (i, h)
2. c0i = ci for any i born after t.
It is short run (e,C)-optimal if it is (e,C)-optimal for all It, t ≥ 0.
Whereas short run optimality is necessary for optimality, it is not suﬃcient
since, as first shown by Samuelson [15], some transfers involving all generations
can make all of them better oﬀ. In risk-free economies, the optimality of a
short run optimal allocation is guaranteed by a condition on the supporting
interest rates. In order to extend such condition, one may consider a process
that implicitly supports a short run optimal allocation, if it exists.
Given a consumption plan ci in Ci, a possible history h at date ei, let ci,h be
the ”restriction” of ci to the states that succeed h, i.e. ci,h is the consumption
plan that coincides with ci for those states and is equal to zero otherwise.
7 Also
denote by Ci,h the obtained set. Note that E[ui(ci)|h] = E[ui(ci,h)|h].
A process Q = (Qτ , τ = 0, ...), where Qτ is measurable with respect to sτ ,
positive, is called a valuation process. Let . denote the scalar product. Then
E[Q.ci,h] = E[
τ=TiX
τ=ti
X
sτÂh
Qτci,τ (s
τ )],
is equal to the expected value weighted by Q of i0s consumption plan following
history h, ci,h.
Definition 5 A valuation process Q supports the allocation c for It if
1. for any i who is born before t, any c0i ∈ Ci, any history h at date ei,
if E[ui(c
0
i)|h] > E[ui(ci)|h] then E[Q.c0i,h] > E[Q.ci,h]
2. for any τ < maxi∈It Ti, any history h at date τ ,
kτ maximizes E[Qτ+1f(k, ρτ+1)−Qτk|h]
7Formally ci,h,t(s
t) = ci,t(s
t) if st succeeds h and zero otherwise. When h runs over all
possible histories at date ei, a partition of all possible events during i
0s life is obtained, so
that ci is characterized by its restrictions ci,h over all possible histories h at date ei.
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Conditions 1 and 2 bear on the consumption plans of the agents born before t,
so that they impose no restriction later than maxi∈It Ti. They depend both on
the consumption sets and evaluation dates of these agents. The larger the space
spanned by Ci, the earlier the evaluation date ei, the more stringent condition
1 is. If a supporting process exists for any It, the allocation is clearly short
run optimal, but the converse is not necessarily true, except under additional
assumptions.
Assumption A1 For each i
(i) a consumption plan ci is feasible if and only if, for each history h at date ei,
its restriction ci,h belongs to Ci,h. Equivalently, Ci = ΠCi,h, the product over
all histories h at date ei,
(ii) the sets Ci,h are convex,
(iii) let i live at t and ht be a history that follows h at t; if ci,h belongs to Ci,h,
for ε small enough, ci,h + ε1(ht) belongs to Ci,h, where 1(ht) is equal to 1 at
date t in history ht and zero otherwise.
By condition (i), the constraints that bear on i’s consumption plans are
independent across the possible histories at the evaluation date, a mild as-
sumption since i’s welfare is evaluated before birth. Assumption (ii), which
is standard in microeconomic theory, is not innocuous in our set up, as we
shall see in section 4. Under condition (iii), consumption at a given date can
be modified by a small amount in any event that is publicly observable; con-
straints on consumption sets are therefore linked to a lack of public information
since, with full information, a consumption plan can be (locally) modified in
any state. Using that whatever two consecutive dates there is always an agent
alive at both dates, condition (iii) ensures that the economy satisfies a resource
relatedness assumption, which is necessary to get the existence of supporting
prices.
We normalize value processes, which are defined up to a multiplicative con-
stant, by picking an agent who is alive at date 0, say agent 1, and by requiring
the condition E[Q.c1] = 1. Let Qt be the set of normalized processes that
support the allocation c up to t.
Proposition The sets Qt are decreasing : Qt+1 ⊂ Qt, any t. Under A1, a
C-feasible allocation is It-optimal if and only if there is a process that supports
it for It, i.e. if Qt is nonempty.
The proof follows from standard separation arguments applied to an artifi-
cial economy where agents are the pairs (i, h) in which i is born before t and h
is a possible history at the date where i’s utility is evaluated.8
Example 1. Let us consider an exchange economy with full information and
no constraints on consumption plans (Ci = Xi for all i). Short run interim
8Aliprantis-Brown-Burkinshaw [2] study the existence of a price process that supports a
short run optimal allocation (called Malinvaud optimal) for each t, i.e. with our notation an
element in the intersection of the Qt. Their results are obtained in an OLG model with an
infinite dimensional commodity space and a finite number of agents each period. Presumably
they could be used to handle an infinite state space, with the diﬃculty that, in our model, an
infinite state space typically induces an infinite number of agents each period in our artificial
economy.
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optimality is then equivalent to the equalization of the marginal rates of substi-
tution between current and next period’s consumption across the agents alive
at those dates :9 for any st, any st+1 = (st, st+1), there is a positive value,
denoted by mrs(st+1|st), such that for any individual i who is alive at date t
and date t+ 1 :
E[
∂ui(ci)
∂ci,t+1
|st+1]/E[∂ui(ci)
∂ci,t
|st] = mrs(st+1|st).
A supporting process is unique, defined recursively by E[Q.c1] = 1 and the
formula:
Qt+1(s
t+1) = Qt(s
t)mrs(st+1|st). (2)
Now let us consider, instead of interim optimality, the stronger ex ante optimal-
ity concept. While the above conditions are necessary, but there are no longer
suﬃcient: the marginal rates of substitution between consumption in diﬀerent
states at birth should be proportional to Q.
3.2 Suﬃcient conditions for optimality
We show here that, whatever optimality concept is used, a single condition
guarantees the optimality of a short run optimal allocation.
Theorem 1 Let the evaluation dates e and the sets C be given, and assume
A1. A short run (e,C)-optimal allocation is (e,C)-optimal if
lim
t→∞
inf
Q∈Qt
E[
t=t+`X
τ=t+1
Qτ ] = 0. (S)
With full information and no constraints on consumption plans as in example
1 above, Qt is a singleton. Condition (S) is then equivalent to limt→∞E[Qt] =
0, and the usual argument works as follows. Start with a short run optimal
allocation. To (weakly) improve the situation the agents who are born before
t, these agents must receive some aggregate transfers that have a positive value
under Q. These transfers can only be given by the generations born between
t + 1 and t + `, and are therefore bounded. Moreover, if no agent is to be
made not worse oﬀ, the value of the transfers to agents born before t does not
decrease with t. Condition (S) implies however that such value converges to
zero, hence is zero at all dates. If consumption plans are constrained, the same
type of argument can be used by considering the whole set of processes that
support a short run optimal allocation.10 Note also that condition (S) is surely
met if the value of aggregate wealth is finite for some supporting process (the
finite value condition has been introduced by Wilson [15]).
9Borch [4] has been the first to show that optimal risk sharing implies such conditions. Of
course, mrs(st+1|st) multiplied by the transition probability P (st+1|st) is the implicit Arrow
Debreu price of one consumption unit available at date t+ 1 contingent on the realization of
st+1 in terms of the good at t if s
t is the state of the world.
10Some technical care is needed because a value process is unconstrained on the space
orthogonal to feasible consumption plans; as a result the value of transfers computed at a
given supporting process may be unbounded.
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Theorem 1 can be readily applied to an OLG economy with a two period
lived representative agent as considered by Abel and alii [1]. They consider
an equilibrium, assuming that an infinitely lived asset distributes (random)
dividends, dt at t. They show that if the asset price pt does not converge
to zero, and satisfy for some ε > 0: dt > εpt in all periods and all states
of natures, then the equilibrium is interim optimal. To see that Theorem 1
applies, note that, with a two period-lived representative generation, short run
interim optimality holds at equilibrium (production decisions are optimal and
no risk sharing can take place). A supporting process is defined recursively by
(2) where mrs(.|st) is the marginal rate of substitution of the representative
agent born in period t, state st. Therefore, the asset price satisfies
(Qtpt)(s
t) = E[Qt+1(pt+1 + dt+1)|st)] ≥ (1 + ²)E[Qt+1pt+1|st].
Iteration and expectation imply that condition (S) is met.
According to Abel and alii [1], the above dividend condition is satisfied in
the United States. One question however is whether such a condition is still
suﬃcient for optimality with an heterogeneous population, and/or agents who
live for more than two periods. We shall investigate this question in sections 4
and 5.
Condition (S) is not necessary. For example in a risk-free economy, a sta-
tionary allocation is optimal whenever the interest rate is non negative whereas
(S) is satisfied only if the interest rate is strictly positive. Under additional
conditions on utility and production functions, condition (S) can be weakened
somewhat. That we need such assumptions is already known from risk-free
economies (see Okuno-Zilcha [12] who obtain a full characterization11).
Assumptions A2. Utility functions are twice diﬀerentiable with a uniformly
bounded Hessian: for some positive α, for any i any c
−x0u00i (c)x ≤ α||x||2
∂ui/∂ci,t is uniformly bounded at c
f is twice diﬀerentiable with respect to k; if k is a bound on investment, there
is β > 0 such that −f”k,k(k, ρ) ≥ β for any k ≤ k, any ρ.
Theorem 2 Let the evaluation dates e and the sets C be given, and assume
A1 and A2. A bounded, short run (e,C)-optimal allocation is (e,C)-optimal if
for some K, any t
inf
Q∈Qt
E[
t=t+`X
τ=t+1
Qτ ] ≤ K. (W )
11Such a characterization has been extended by Chattopadhyay-Gottardi [5] in a two pe-
riod lived OLG economy with multiple goods. They consider the interim optimality of an
equilibrium with sequentially complete markets (actually, they use the terminology of condi-
tional optimality, which we have rather used for stationary allocations that are conditioned on
some states as defined in the next subsection). As should be clear (see also Section 4), with
sequentially complete markets, an equilibrium is short run interim optimal. An interesting
practical feature of our formulation is that it can be easily checked, while their criterion is
rather cumbersome. The criterion involves the convergence of an infinite weighted sum of the
inverse of prices in which the weights depend on preferences.
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Without assumptions A2, for example with risk neutral agents, there are ex-
amples where (W) is met but the allocation is not optimal.
3.3 Time invariant economies and conditional optimality
In two period OLG economies that are subject to some time invariant Markov
exogenous state of nature, it is quite natural to focus on time invariant alloca-
tions. This approach, initiated by Muench (1977), leads to consider conditional
optimality, which amounts to compare time invariant allocations among each
others, as defined below. We first state conditions (S) and (W) for a time in-
variant allocation in such economies, and then compare our results with the
characterization of conditional optimality obtained by Aiayagari-Peled (1991).
In a two period OLG exchange economy, assume that the state of nature12
s follows a finite first order Markov process with time invariant transition prob-
abilities π(s0|s). At each date t, t ≥ 1, a new two-period lived generation is
born, each of which consists of M agents of type m = 1, ...,M . Except for the
old agents alive at the initial date, agents are indexed by their birth’s date and
type.
An allocation is time invariant if, given his type, the consumption plans
of an agent depend on time only through the states of nature that are realized
during his life. It is therefore characterized by the consumption of the initial old
agents, and state dependent consumption for each type m: (cym(s), c
o
m(s, s
0), s ∈
S, s0 ∈ S), which give the consumption plans a type h agent if s is realized when
young, and s0 when old.
With full information and no constraint on consumption sets, this economy
is a particular case of example 1. Short run interim optimality is therefore
equivalent to the equalization of the marginal rates of substitution across the
living agents, and a supporting price process is defined by (2). Since marginal
rates of substitution inherit the time invariance property of the allocation, this
identical value writes as mrs(s0|s) where s = sτ and s0 = sτ+1 are the states of
nature realized at τ and τ +1. Conditions (S) and (W) may be stated in terms
of the square matrix B = (π(s0|s)mrs(s0|s)) :
Condition (S) (resp. (W)) is equivalent to the dominant root of the
square positive matrix B to be strictly less (resp. less) than 1.13
In this set up, a time invariant allocation is conditionally optimal if it is not
possible to increase the expected utility of the agents born in some state of
12Note that we use the word state of nature and not state of the world. For the moment
it is enough to think of s as the fundamental shock that determines current resources, but
see below for some precision. Also the analysis can be extended to the case where s reflects
preference shocks.
13To see this, let denote S = (s1, .., sk, ..sn) the set of states, and 1 be the n-vector with all
components equal to 1. Simple computation shows that E[Qt|s0 = sk], the expectation of the
supporting price conditional on the initial state to be sk, is equal, up to a constant, to the
k-th component of the n-vector Bt1. Since all elements of A are positive, it is well known that
Bt1 converges to 0 (resp. is bounded ) if and only if B has its dominant eigenvalue strictly
less (resp. not larger) than 1.
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nature without lowering that of the agents born in some other state.14 Clearly
interim optimality implies conditional optimality but the converse is not clear.
Aiayagari-Peled (1991) show that a short run optimal time invariant allocation
is conditionally optimal if and only if the dominant root of the square positive
matrix B is less than or equal to 1. Using the previous results, a conditionally
optimal time invariant allocation is also interim optimal : it is dominated by
no feasible allocation, time invariant or not. Therefore both concepts coincide.
This result is interesting for the following reason. Conditional optimality is
defined with respect to an a priori state space which looks rather arbitrary. If s
is the ”fundamental” state at each date, the state may be enlarged, for example
by including past realizations of the state or a sunspot variable (still keeping the
first order Markov assumption). A natural question is whether, starting from an
allocation that is conditionally optimal with respect to the fundamental states,
a Pareto improvement could be obtained by allowing dependence on these richer
states. From the previous result, the answer is negative.
Whereas conditional and interim optimality coincide in this set up, condi-
tional optimality, at least as we have just defined, is not an adequate criterion in
most economies. Even in economies with a time invariant structure for which a
natural state can be defined, this state typically includes endogenous variables,
such as the distribution of the securities across agents (except under special
cases such as two period-lived agents) or the stock of capital. In contrast with
interim optimality, conditional optimality, which takes the state as given, does
not evaluate the impact of a change in the endogenous variables.
Finally note that the dominant root condition characterizes conditional op-
timality : If the dominant root is strictly larger than 1, the allocation is not con-
ditionally optimal, and therefore not interim optimal. This suggests that condi-
tion (W) is quite close to be necessary for optimality (see also Chattopadhyay-
Gottardi [15] on this point).
4 Optimality of equilibria
We study here the optimality of an equilibrium in an economy where agents
receive some (random) endowments, transact an infinitely lived asset, ”land”,
and possibly some financial securities in zero supply.
4.1 An economy with productive land
We consider an exchange economy,15 with two kinds of resources, land and
private endowments. Land is an infinitely lived asset in fixed supply which
distributes (random) dividends at all periods, dt at t. It is said to be productive
14At a time invariant allocation, the utility level of a type m agent born in state s is well
defined. So a time invariant allocation is conditionally optimal is there is no other feasible
time invariant allocation for which all the ”conditional” utility levels of all agents could be
increased.
15The analysis is readily extended to the case where production is performed under constant
returns to scale or under sequentially complete markets. Otherwise, a profit criterium for a
firm is undefined.
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if dividends are uniformly bounded below by some stricly positive d : dt ≥ d
any t ≥ 0.
Resources. Agent i receives endowments, wi,t, which are non negative, and
null if agent does not live at t. At the initial date 0, before the exchanges,
agents who were born before hold the land asset; their endowments at date 0
include the returns of their previous investments and the receipts of the risk
sharing arrangements that they have contracted among themselves.
Aggregate resources at t, which are given by ωt =
P
iwi,t+ dt, are assumed
to be uniformly bounded above. A state of the world at date t is described
by the sequence of the realized private endowments and land dividends from
date 0 up to t.
Securities. Agents transact the land asset and some financial securities.
Financial securities that pay oﬀ in the consumption good allow agents living at
two consecutive dates to share risks associated with the next period. Assume, as
typical in the incomplete markets literature, that these contracts are exogenous,
and in a limited number J :16 a unit of contract j, contracted at time t, yields
a (random) amount ajt+1 of consumption good at t + 1. Payoﬀs at t + 1 are
measurable with respect to the state at t + 1. Let pt denote the price of land
at t, qt = (q
j
t ) the vector of security prices at t, and at+1 = (a
j
t+1) the security
returns at t+ 1.
Transfers. The government may operate some transfers, which are assumed
to be implemented at birth (we comment this assumption below): agent i re-
ceives ri,t at t = ti, which may be positive or negative, and ri,t = 0 at t 6= ti.
Transfers must be balanced,
P
ri,t = 0 for each t, and measurable with respect
to information. We denote by r = (ri,t, i, t = 0, ...) the process of transfers.
Agents’ budget constraints. Let xi,t and yi,t = (y
j
i,t) be the share in land
and the portfolio of securities that agent i holds at t after the exchanges. Ac-
cordingly, if agent i was born before date 0, xi,−1 is set equal to his initial land
holding, and yi,−1 is null; if he is born at or after date 0, he holds no portfolio
before the exchanges at date ti : xi,ti−1, yi,ti−1 are null. Given the (random)
prices of the land and financial securities, and denoting by . the scalar product,
the successive budget constraints that agent i faces are given by :(
ci,t + ptxi,t + qt.yi,t = wi,t + (dt + pt)xi,t−1 + at.yi,t−1 + ri,t, t = ti, .., Ti
where xi,t, yi,t are measurable and xi,Ti = 0, y
j
i,Ti
= 0.
(C)
To require the portfolio at date Ti to be null is crucial : otherwise, agent i is
willing to borrow as much as possible at the last period of his life.
4.2 Equilibria with sequentially complete markets
We consider an equilibrium in which agents correctly expect their budget con-
straints, i.e. the future prices, and there is complete information on the state
of the world.
16This is merely for notational convenience. Since the security returns are not required to
be linearly independent, assuming a fixed number of securities only amounts to assume that
their number is uniformly bounded.
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Definition 6 Given some transfers r, a rational expectation equilibrium (REE)
is formed with a feasible allocation c, measurable price processes for the land
p = (pt, t = 0, ...) and the financial securities q
j = (qjt , t = 0, ...) that satisfy
1. for any i, any state sti at birth ti, agent i’s consumption plan maximizes
E[ui(ci)|sti ] over the portfolios that satisfy the constraints (C), where
prices are correctly expected
2. markets clear at each date, any state st:
P
i xi,t = 1,
P
i yi,t = 0
Markets are sequentially complete if, for each state st, the space that is
spanned by the returns of the financial securities and the land, (ajt+1, (dt+1 +
pt+1)), is of dimension equal to the number of states s
t+1 that follow st. Recall
that Xi denotes i’s unconstrained consumption set.
Theorem 3 Consider a rational expectations equilibrium in an economy with
productive land, and complete information. If markets are sequentially complete
and the equilibrium allocation is short run (e,X)-optimal, then it is (e,X)-
optimal as well.
Corollary Consider a rational expectations equilibrium in an economy with
productive land, and complete information. If markets are sequentially com-
plete, the equilibrium allocation is interim X-optimal.
The proof of Theorem 3 is a direct application of Theorem 1, by using the
fact that condition (S) is surely satisfied.17
A positive implication of Theorem 3 is that, under the stated assumptions
and as far as optimality is concerned, the intervention of a government is jus-
tified only to restore short run optimality. With sequentially complete markets
this means to improve risk sharing between generations. Otherwise, no inter-
vention is necessary, as stated by the Corollary : sequentially complete markets
allow living agents to optimally trade, so that an equilibrium is short run in-
terimX optimal.18 This result generalizes a well known result obtained in OLG
models without uncertainty. This is however no longer true whenever utility
levels are evaluated before birth, i.e. if ei < ti for some i. An equilibrium has
few chance to be short run (e, X)-optimal : agents cannot trade before their
birth so that markets do not allow for insurance against the events at birth.
By implementing adequate non distortionary transfers among a finite number
of generations, risk sharing may be improved. It is easily shown that, with
sequentially complete markets, these transfers can always be implemented at
birth, which justifies our assumption.
Since fiat money is an infinitely lived asset similar to land except that its
dividends are null, one may wonder whether similar optimality results hold at
a REE with money. It is indeed the case if the price of money is positively
17If Q is a supporting process, land prices satisfy : Q0p0 = E[
Pt
τ=1Qτdτ +Qtpt] any t so
that, using that dividends are larger than some positive d, condition (S) follows.
18It suﬃces to apply standard results to the finite economies composed with all agents born
before a given date, and in which there are as many agents i as possible states at birth.
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bounded below (and the additional assumptions of Theorem 2) since then con-
dition (W) is met (see Demange-Laroque [6] for similar results in a stationary
economy). However, whether an equilibrium with fiat money exists depends in
a non trivial way on preferences and endowments, and even if it does, other
equilibria in which money is not transacted typically exist; accordingly, if pro-
ductive land is not transacted, interim optimality is not guaranteed even with
complete markets.
If markets are incomplete, the standard approach, and Theorem 1, cannot
be applied except in few circumstances. It is enough for our purpose to consider
a two period OLG model. Given the transfers r and an associated equilibrium
price p, a consumption plan of an agent i born at t belongs to the set Cpi :
Cpi = {ci = (ci,t, ci,t+1), s.t. ci,t+1 = wi,t+1 + (dt+1 + pt+1)xi,t + at+1.yi,t,
for some measurable xi,t, yi,t}
Cpi is a convex subset of Xi so that, by the same arguments as for Theorem 3,
an equilibrium is interim Cp-optimal. This result is however rather weak, and
one would like to assess the eﬀect of the transfers on optimality, which means
to compare the equilibrium allocations that are obtained for diﬀerent transfers.
Changing the transfers induces changes in the demand for land, which typically
aﬀect its price, and the sets Cp.19 As a result, if the government takes into
account this equilibrium eﬀect, the consumption sets Cp at the given equilib-
rium price are no longer relevant. Taking the union of the sets over various
prices does not make sense since the consumption plans of diﬀerent agents are
interdependent, and moreover the union is not convex. This problem is at the
root of the generic constrained ineﬃciency of an equilibrium when markets are
incomplete (Geanakoplos-Polemarchakis [8]). In economies with a finite hori-
zon, non convexity arises except in the case of a single consumption good and
two dates since then the spanning is exogenous given by the securities payoﬀs.
In an OLG setup such as here, it occurs even if agents live for two periods
only since the sharing possibilities of an agent are aﬀected by the future land
price, which is itself aﬀected by the future transfers. In such a case short run
optimality is no longer characterized by the existence of a supporting process,
and Theorem 1 cannot be applied. In the following section, we show however
that an equilibrium with land still satisfies some optimality properties.
If information is incomplete, Theorem 3 of course extends to the situation
where agents and the planner share the same information, and markets are
sequentially complete with respect to that information: it suﬃces to redefine
the state of the world. But presumably agents have some private information,
say on their endowments, that the planner does not have. A rather extreme
situation is one where agents have full information on the state of the world.
Of course the transfers must be measurable with respect to the information
19In some cases however this does not occur. For example let each generation be composed
with several agents that are identical except that they suﬀer from idiosyncratic shocks on
their endowments. If only aggregate endowment is observable and markets are complete with
respect to that information, consumption sets Cpi are not aﬀected by transfers.
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available when they are implemented. Then Corollary of Theorem 3 extends.20
However, if the government uses a stronger criterium, say ex ante utility the
result is no longer true. The reason is quite similar to the incomplete market
case: transfers and equilibrium prices are correlated, and since all transfers are
not admissible, the set of consumption plans of an agent is not convex.
5 Two period life models with incomplete markets
We focus here on interim optimality in two period life OLG models with
possibly incomplete markets. In what follows, an agent i who is born at date t
dies at t+ 1; the set of agents born at t is the generation Gt.
5.1 Equilibrium with land
It is natural to ask whether the interim optimality of an equilibrium with land
and sequentially complete markets, extends to incomplete markets in a second
best or constrained sense. Here, keeping the returns of the financial securities
fixed, we compare the equilibrium allocations that are obtained when some
transfers vary. Of course, some restriction must be imposed on the transfers
under consideration to get some optimality result: If, starting from an equilib-
rium allocation with incomplete markets, transfers could be performed without
constraints among the old agents, almost surely the lack of risk sharing oppor-
tunities could be exploited so as to improve the standing allocation. Therefore,
we stick to the assumption that transfers are implemented at birth only.21
The government may perform lump sum transfers, and also reallocate the
financial securities among the young agents of a given generation. Accordingly,
agent i born at t receives lump sum ri,t, and an endowment of the financial
securities zi,t = (z
j
i,t); since transfers at date t are implemented among the young
members of generation Gt, they satisfy the feasibility conditions : Pi∈Gt ri,t = 0
and
P
i∈Gt zi,t = 0. Transfers are therefore characterized by the process r =
(ri,t, i ∈ Gt, t = 0, ...) and z = (zi,t, i ∈ Gt, t = 0, ...).
An equilibrium is defined accordingly. We also consider a short sales condi-
tion on land, which means here that young agents can only buy land.
Given some transfers (r, z), an equilibrium with (resp. without) short sales
on land is formed with a feasible allocation c, measurable price processes for the
land p = (pt, t = 0, ...) and the financial securities q = (qt = (q
j
t ), t = 0, ...) that
satisfy
1. for any old agent i at date 0 : ci,0 = wi,0 + xi,−1(p0 + d0)
20The allocation is interim X-optimal, and supported by a process Q. If Eui[ci|h] can be
increased, necessarily Eui[ci|st] can be increased for at least one state in h, which implies that
ri(h) is positive. Since this must hold for any agent born at that date, this contradicts the
feasibility of the transfers.
21At the initial date, transfers could be implemented between the young and the old agents
without modifying risk sharing among the old agents, and a slight modification of the proof
shows that Theorem 3 is still valid.
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for any i born at t, t ≥ 0, any st, agent i maximizes E[ui(ci)|st] over
consumption plans that satisfy



ci,t + ptxi,t + qt.yi,t = wi,t + ri,t + qt.zi,t,
ci,t+1 = wi,t+1 + xi,t(pt+1 + dt+1) + at+1.yi,t
for some portfolio xi,t, yi,t (resp. with xi,t ≥ 0)
2. markets clear at each date, any state st:
P
i xi,t = 1,
P
i yi,t = 0.
Theorem 4 extends, in a constrained sense, the interim optimality of an
equilibrium with land and sequentially complete markets (Corollary of Theorem
3), to the case of incomplete markets.
Theorem 4 In a two period life overlapping generations economy with pro-
ductive land and financial securities, let c be an equilibrium allocation (with
or without short sales) associated with transfers (r, z). If c0 is an equilibrium
sustained by transfers (r0, z0) and without short sales on land, then c0 does not
interim Pareto dominate c.
By the clearing condition, young agents, on aggregate, buy land. A short sales
constraint is therefore likely not to be binding. Also, it is surely not binding
with a representative agent by period; therefore Theorem 4 extends Abel and
alii [1] to heterogeneous population and incomplete markets. By the same
remark, with a re From Theorem 4, if short sales are forbidden, any equilibrium
allocation is interim optimal among the equilibrium allocations.
If, starting from an equilibrium and modifying transfers, land price was not
aﬀected by the transfers, the proof would be easy : both the spanning and the
aggregate exchanges between the old and young agents at a given date, which
operate through the land asset only, would be unaﬀected; hence a welfare im-
provement could be obtained only by a reallocation among the members of a
given generation through a change in securities prices and portfolios, which
is impossible at an equilibrium (equivalently, using the sets Cp introduced in
the previous sections, an equilibrium is Cp−optimal. But typically modifying
transfers has an impact on land price, which aﬀects both the risk sharing op-
portunities of the young agents and the level of the aggregate transfers between
generations. From the above discussion, it is in this change only that a Pareto
improvement can be found. However, the first date at which the new equilib-
rium diﬀers, the price of land must be increased, since otherwise the old agents
would suﬀer. Then, to be Pareto improving, one may show that the expected
land prices at the new equilibrium would have to grow unbounded, where the
expectation is taken with respect to a convenient probability distribution, with
a density with respect to the original probability made up with a combination
of the marginal rates of substitution of the young agents. The basic intuition
for the result is that, at the initial equilibrium, marginal rates of substitution
are, on average, smaller than 1.
5.2 Equilibrium with Social Security
A pay-as-you-go Social Security system specifies the compulsory amounts that
are transferred from the young agents to the old ones. In a risk-free economy,
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such a system may lead to a Pareto improvement upon the autarkic equilibrium.
It is however not true under some interest rates condition. In a two period OLG
economy with uncertainty and possibly incomplete markets, we show that an
analogous result holds, under some condition on the returns of the financial
securities.
As is often the case in practice, we assume that old agents receive a pension
in proportion of their previous contribution : Let mt be the aggregate contribu-
tion of generation Gt to the system at date t, given the state; a member of this
generation who contributes a fraction f , i.e. gives fmt, is entitled to a pension
equal to the fraction f of the aggregate contribution of next generation, i.e.
to fmt+1. At the initial date 0, the living old agents receive the contribution
m0 of the current young agents in some specified proportions fi,−1. A Social
Security system is therefore characterized by m = (mt, t = 0, ...), the process
of aggregate contributions of each generation, and f = (fi,t, i ∈ Gt, t = −1, 0...)
the nonnegative process that specifies in which proportion members of a given
generation participate to the system, where
P
i∈Gt fi,t = 1. An equilibrium is
defined as follows.
Given financial securities a, transfers (r, z), and a Social Security system
(m, f), an equilibrium is formed with a feasible allocation c, and a measurable
security price process q = (qt = (q
j
t ), t = 0, ...) that satisfy
1. for any old agent at date 0, ci,0 = wi,0 + fi,−1m0
for any i born at t ≥ 0, any state st at t, agent i’s consumption plan
maximizes E[ui(ci)|st] over consumption plans that satisfy(
ci,t + qt.yi,t = wi,t − fi,tmt + ri,t + qt.zi,t,
ci,t+1 = wi,t+1 + fi,tmt+1 + at+1.yi,t, for some yi,t
2. markets clear at each date, any state st:
P
i yi,t = 0.
We now state a condition that bears on the successive returns of financial
securities. A portfolio y = (yj) at t, state st has a strictly positive payoﬀ if
at+1.y > 0 in any state at t+1 following s
t; its (random) gross return is defined
as
Rt+1 =
at+1.y
qt(st).y
.
Condition (R) is satisfied at an equilibrium if there is a measurable process
(yt, t = 0, ...) of portfolios with strictly positive payoﬀs, such that the product of
the returns from date 0 up to t: πtτ=0Rτ tends almost surely to infinity when t
tends to infinity.
Clearly, condition (R) is satisfied at a stationary allocation in Samuelson
model when the interest rate is above the population growth: Also, in the time
invariant model of Section 3.3, (R) is met if the dominant root of the matrix B
made up with the marginal rates of substitution is strictly less than 1.
The optimality of the autarkic equilibrium in Samuelson model under the
interest rate condition extends as follows.
18
Theorem 5 Consider a two period life overlapping generations economy with
financial securities a. Let c be an equilibrium allocation associated with trans-
fers (r, z), and no Social Security (m = 0) and c0 an equilibrium allocation
associated with transfers (r0, z0) and Social Security system (m0, f 0). If condi-
tion (R) is satisfied at c, then c0 does not interim Pareto dominate c.
In other words, condition (R) guarantees that an autarkic equilibrium is second
best optimal, in a world where a planner can only introduce a ”fair” Social
Security system, and reallocate the good and the financial securities. This may
be surprising since such a system introduces a new risk sharing opportunity,
which unambiguously enlarges the spanning.
Note that we do not require the contributions to be nonnegative. But,
arguing as previously, a Pareto improvement is possible only if some intergen-
erational transfers are implemented, (m0 diﬀers from 0), and at any date in any
state where it starts to be implemented, it must be positive since otherwise
surely old agents would suﬀer. Later on, for the generations to be not worse
oﬀ, the expected contributions should grow unbounded, thanks to condition
(R), where the expectation is taken with respect to a convenient probability
distribution.
6 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. The proof follows from standard separation argu-
ments. Let c be an allocation that is optimal for It. Denote by T = maxi∈It Ti,
i.e. all agents born before t die before T . Let us consider the economy for which
- there are as many goods as possible states sτ from τ = 0 up to T
- agents are the pairs a = (i, h) in which i is born before t and h is a possible
information state at date ei. The consumption set of agent a = (i, h) is the
set Ci,h, and his preferences are represented by the expected utility of u
i given
the information h. Thanks to the separability of Von Neumann-Morgenstern
preferences, and the fact that i’s utility is evaluated no later than birth date,
(i, h), (i, h0) care with consumption plans over disjoint sets of states and can be
considered as diﬀerent agents.
- aggregate endowments are equal to those of the initial economy, diminished
by the consumption, as given by c, of the agents born after t, and also by the
investment at the final date, which gives :
ωτ if τ ≤ t, ωτ −
P
i,ti>t ci,τ if t < τ < T , and ωT −
P
i,ti>t ci,T − kT at T
- there are as many firms as histories before T : if, h is an information state
at τ , τ < T , firm h chooses investment k at date τ and produces f(k, ρτ+1) at
date τ + 1 in all states that may follow h when ρt+1 is realized.
If allocation c is optimal for It, its restriction to the agents (i, hei) of this
artificial economy is Pareto optimal. Under Assumptions A1 this economy
satisfies the standard convexity and non satiation assumptions. Therefore, by
the second fundamental theorem of welfare economics, there is an equilibrium
price vector (p(sτ )), τ = 0, .., T that supports it. Any positive process Q such
that Qτ (s
τ ) = p(sτ )/P (sτ ) for τ ≤ T is in Qt.
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The proof of Theorem 1 uses the following lemma.
Lemma 1 Let c and c0 be two feasible allocations, and ∆c = c0 − c. Given t
let T = maxi∈It Ti. If Q is a value process, then :
E[
X
i∈It
Q∆ci] +E[
TX
t+1
Qτ (
X
i,ti>t
∆ci,τ )] +E[
TX
0
∆πτ ] +QT (k
0
T − kT ) = 0 (3)
where ∆πτ = E[Qτ+1f(k0τ , ρτ+1)−Qτk0τ ]− [Qτ+1f(kτ , ρτ+1)−Qτkτ ].
Proof of Lemma 1. The allocation c0 satisfies the scarcity constraints:
c0τ + k
0
τ = f(k
0
τ−1, ρτ ) + ωτ
Let Q be in Qt. Multiplying the scarcity constraints at time τ by Qτ , adding
them from date 0 up to date T and taking expectation at date 0, one gets
E[
TX
τ=0
Qτ c
0
τ ] +E[
TX
τ=0
Qτ+1f(k
0
τ , ρτ+1)−Qτk0τ ] +E[QTk0T ] = E[
TX
τ=0
Qτωτ ]
The same equation holds true for the allocation c, hence taking the diﬀerence
yields
E[
TX
τ=0
Qτ∆cτ ] +E[
TX
0
∆πτ ] +QT (k
0
T − kT ) = 0 (4)
Equation (4) diﬀers from (3) only through the first terms. For τ ≤ t all con-
sumers were surely born before t so that aggregate consumption at date τ is
exactly equal to the aggregate consumption of agents in It. This is not ex-
actly true after t, since then aggregate consumption includes the consumption
of the agents who are born after t. Therefore cτ =
P
i∈It ci,τ if τ ≤ t and
cτ =
P
i∈It ci,τ +
P
i,ti>t ci,τ if τ > t and similarly for c
0. So taking the diﬀer-
ence and rearranging terms gives:
E[
TX
0
Qτ∆cτ ] = E[
X
i∈It
Q.∆ci] +E[
TX
t+1
Qτ (
X
i,ti>t
∆ci,τ )]
which proves (3).
Lemma 2 Assume that E[u1(c
0
1)|h0] > E[u1(c1)|h0]. Then there is δ > 0 such
that for any t ≥ 0 infQ∈QtE[Q.(c01 − c1)] ≥ δ.
Proof of Lemma 2. Since the sets Qt are decreasing it suﬃces to prove the
property for t = 0. Recall that agent 1 lives at date 0 and that E[Q.c1] = 1
for any Q ∈ Q0. Given a process Q in Q0 let us consider P its orthogonal
projection on the finite dimensional subspace spanned by the set C1 − {c1}.
Then E[P.(x1 − c1)] = E[Q.(x1 − c1)] for any x1 in C1. One deduces that
E[Q.(c01 − c1)] = E[P.(c01 − c1)] and that P satisfies:
if x1 is in C1 and E[u1(x1)] > E[u1(c1)] then E[P.x1] > E[P.c1],
which says that P belongs to the positive cone that ”supports” c1. Using
the normalization E[Q.c1] = 1, it implies that P belongs to a compact set P.
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Therefore surely infP∈PE[P.(c01−c1)] is strictly positive. Since infP∈PE[P.(c01−
c1)] = infQ∈QtE[Q.(c01 − c1)], this gives the result.
Proof of Theorem 1. Let c be a bounded allocation that satisfies short run
e-optimality and the transversality condition. By contradiction consider some
C-feasible allocation c0 that weakly dominates c. Thanks to assumption A1
(ii), one may assume that agent 1 is strictly better oﬀ. If it is not the case,
there is an agent i who is strictly better oﬀ given information h at ei. Let hti
be an information set that follows h at date ti (if ei = ti, then h = h
ti). By
A1 (ii) and continuity of preferences, for small enough ² > 0, c0i,h − ²1(hti) is
feasible and preferred to ci,h by agent (i, h). Now there is an agent j who lives
at dates ti− 1 and ti. Let h0 be the unique history at date ej that precedes hti .
Thanks to A1 (ii) again, one may add ²1(hti) to c0j,h0 (or little less if necessary
for feasibility) and make agent (j, h0), who is born before i, strictly better oﬀ
than at cj,h0 . Continuing backward, agent 1 can be made better oﬀ.
Now let us consider date t and a process in Qt. Since c0 dominates c, surely
E[Q.(c0i,h−ci,h)] ≥ 0 for any agent in It, so that adding over all possible histories
h at date ei : E[Q.(c
0
i − ci)] ≥ 0. Similarly E[∆πτ ] ≥ 0. Therefore, using (3) of
Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, we get that for some δ > 0, which is independent of t
and Q,
δ +E[
TX
τ=t+1
Qτ (
X
i,ti>t
c0i,τ − ci,τ ) +QT (k0T − kT )] ≤ 0 (5)
Recall that under our assumptions, c is bounded. Since investment and con-
sumption are nonnegative at the allocation c0, surely, for some B, kT − k0T ≤ B
and ci,τ−c0i,τ ≤ B uniformly. Furthermore the number of agents simultaneously
alive is uniformly bounded. One deduces that there is some K > 0 such that
δ ≤ KE[
t+X`
τ=t+1
Qτ ] for any t ≥ 0. (6)
Now, by condition (S), infQ∈Qt
Pt+`
τ=t+1E[Q(h
τ )] tends to zero : this gives a
contradiction.
Proof of theorem 2. Assume the weak condition (W) together with as-
sumptions A2 to be satisfied. By A2, there is β > 0 such that for any i, any
consumption vectors y and x
ui(y)− ui(x) ≤ u0i(x).(y − x)− β||y − x||2.
Taking expectation knowing h, the diﬀerence in utilities at the two allocations :
∆ui(h) = E[ui(c0i,h)− ui(ci,h)|h] satisfy:
0 ≤ ∆ui(h) ≤ Eu0i(ci,h)(c0i,h − ci,h)− β||c0i,h − ci,h||2. (7)
If Q is a supporting process, there is λ > 0 (which depends on i and h) such
that for any feasible c00
E[u0i(ci,h).(c
00
i,h − ci,h)|h] = λE[Q(c00i,h − ci,h)]
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This holds for c00i = c0i, and for c00i,h = ci,h + ²1i,h, where 1i,h is the consumption
plan which gives one unit of the good in each history following h at each date
where i lives, and zero otherwise (from A1 it is feasible for ² > 0 small enough).
Therefore, E[u0i(ci,h).(1i,h)|h] = λE[Q.(1i,h)] and dividing (7) by λ gives :
0 ≤ ∆ui(h)
λ
≤ EQ(c0i,h − ci,h)− β
EQ.1i,h
E[u0i.1i,h|h]
||c0i,h − ci,h||2
To simplify assume first no production. The proof now follows the same line as
that of theorem 1. Adding the above inequalities over all agents born before t,
all histories at birth, inequality (5) is replaced now by
δ + β
X
i/ti≤t
(
X
h at ei
EQ.1i,h
E[u0i.1i,h|h]
||c0i,h − ci,h||2) ≤ E[
TX
τ=t+1
Qτ (
X
i,ti>t
c0i,τ − ci,τ )].
By condition (W), the right hand side is bounded. The left hand side is increas-
ing, and to be bounded, under A2, it is necessary that EQ.1i,h||c0i,h−ci,h||2 goes
to zero when ti increases. But then the right hand side surely goes to zero; a
contradiction.
With production, under our assumptions, if Q is a supporting process,
E[Qτ+1f(k
0
τ , ρτ+1)−Qτk0τ ]−[Qτ+1f(kτ , ρτ+1)−Qτkτ ]−γE[Qτ+1](k0τ−kτ )2 ≤ 0
and the same type of argument can be used.
Proof of Theorem 4. Let c and c0 be two equilibrium allocations that are
associated with lump sum transfers and reallocation of the financial securities
among the young agents of a given generation, respectively r, z, and r0, z0. As-
sume that c0 (weakly) dominates c : For any t, any agent i born at date t, in
any possible state st at t :
E[ui(c
0
i)|st] ≥ E[ui(ci)|st]. (8)
It suﬃces to show that all inequalities (8) are binding.
Denote mrsi =
∂ui(ci)
∂ci,t+1 /E[
∂ui(ci)
∂ci,t |st], the i0s marginal rate of substitution for
consumption between dates t and t+1 at allocation c. Lemma 3 is valid whether
short sales are allowed or not at equilibrium c.
Lemma 3 Let us assume that c0 dominates c. Then p00 − p0 ≥ 0 and at any
date t ≥ 0, any state st
E[
X
i∈Gt
³
mrsix
0
i,t
´
(p0t+1 − pt+1)|st]− (p0t − pt) ≥ 0 (9)
Proof of lemma 3. Let us consider a state st, and i, a member of generation
Gt. By concavity of the utility function, E[u0(ci).(c0i − ci)|st] ≥ 0
E[
∂ui(ci)
∂ci,t
(c0i,t − ci,t) +
∂ui(ci)
∂ci,t+1
(c0i,t+1 − ci,t+1)|st] ≥ 0.
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Since c0i,t − ci,t is measurable with respect to st, it may be factored out in
the expectation; dividing by the expected marginal utility of consumption at t
gives :
δi = E[mrsi(c
0
i,t+1 − ci,t+1)|st] + (c0i,t − ci,t) ≥ 0. (10)
The diﬀerences in consumption come from the diﬀerences in transfers at date
t, the prices and the chosen portfolios. To simplify notation, we drop index t
in the portfolios. At date t, it may be written as follows :
c0i,t − ci,t = −x0i(p0t − pt)− y0i.(q0t − qt) + (y0i − yi).qt + (x0i − xi)pt + α0i − αi
where αi = (ri,t+ qt.zi,t) is equal to the total value of the transfer at allocation
c, and similarly for α0i. At date t+ 1, when old :
c0i,t+1 − ci,t+1 = x0i(p0t+1 − pt+1) + (y0i − yi).at+1 + (x0i − xi)(dt+1 + pt+1)
At equilibrium c, the first order conditions on the portfolio are met. This gives
for any financial security :
E[mrsia
j
t+1|st]− qjt = 0, any j . (11)
As for the land asset, we get either :
E[mrsi(dt+1 + pt+1)|st]− pt = 0. (12)
if there are no short sales constraint, or
E[mrsi(dt+1 + pt+1)|st]− pt) ≤ 0, with an equality if xi > 0 (13)
if there is a short sales constraint, so that in both cases E[mrsixi(dt+1 +
pt+1)|st]−pt = 0. Using all the above equations, inequality (10) can be rewritten
as
δi = E[mrsi x
0
i(p
0
t+1 − pt+1)|st]− x0i(p0t − pt)− y0i.(q0t − qt) + α0i − αi ≥ 0 (14)
The equilibrium conditions at date t,
P
i∈Gt xi = 1,
P
i∈Gt yi = 0 and
P
i∈Gt αi =
0 are satisfied, and similarly for the 0 values. Summing inequalities (10) over
all agents born at t in state st yields (9).
Consider now an old agent i at date 0. Then c0i,0 − ci,0 = xi,−1(p00 − p0).
Since xi,−1 > 0 for at least one old agent, old agents are not worse oﬀ only if
p00 − p0 ≥ 0.
Rest of the proof of theorem 4 Let us first assume that c is an equilib-
rium without short sales constraint. Using
P
i∈Gt x
0
i,t = 1, and the first order
condition (12) on land, we get
E[
X
i∈Gt
mrsix
0
i,t(
dt+1 + pt+1
pt
)|st] = 1. (15)
Since x0i,t are all nonnegative the function in brackets is a density function with
respect to probability P . This allows us to define a new transition probability
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from t to t+ 1, and by Tulcea’s theorem, a probability measure on the states.
Inequalities (9) can be rewritten as
E∗[
p0t+1 − pt+1
pt+1 + dt+1
|st] ≥ (p
0
t − pt)
pt
, t ≥ 0 (16)
where ∗ denotes the expectation with respect to the new probability. Let the
process φ be defined by φ0 = 1, and
φt = Πτ=tτ=1
pτ
pτ + dτ
.
φt is measurable with respect to the state at t, and satisfies the identity φt(pt+
dt) = ptφt−1, t > 0. Therefore, multiplying inequality (16) by φt, yields
E∗[
p0t+1 − pt+1
pt+1 + dt+1
φt|st] ≥ (p
0
t − pt)
pt + dt
φt−1
Iterating the above inequality from date 0 gives, by the law of iterated expec-
tation, for any t > 0 :
E∗[
p0t+1 − pt+1
pt+1 + dt+1
φt|s0] ≥ E∗[p
0
t − pt
pt + dt
φt−1|s0] ≥ (p
0
0 − p0)
p0
(17)
We first show that φt tends almost surely to zero. Summing the budget equation
of the young agents at date t yields that prices pt are uniformly bounded above
by the bound on ωt. Since moreover dividends are bounded below, for some
λ < 1, pτ/(pτ + dτ ) ≤ λ any τ , which gives the result. Therefore the left
hand side of (17) tends to zero. Since (p00 − p0) is non negative, it implies that
all terms in (17) are identically equal to zero. Going backward, all previous
inequalities, in particular (8), are satisfied as equalities, the desired result.
If there is a short sales constraint, the proof follows the same lines. Since
(12) is replaced by (13), the expectation in (15) is positive not greater than
1, equal to some λt(st). Therefore the function in brackets divided by λt(st)
is a density function with respect to probability P . Inequalities (17) can be
rewritten as
E∗[λt(st)
p0t+1 − pt+1
pt+1 + dt+1
|st] ≥ (p
0
t − pt)
pt
, t ≥ 0.
It suﬃces then to define φt as
φt = Π
τ=t
τ=1
pτλτ
pτ + dτ
,
and the proof follows.
Proof of Theorem 5. The proof follows similar arguments as those of Theo-
rem 4 (without short sales constraint). Consider two equilibrium allocations c
and c0 that are associated respectively with no social security system and m0.
Lemma 3 is replaced by :
Lemma 4. Let c0 dominate c. Then m00 ≥ 0 and at any date t ≥ 0, any st :
E[
X
i∈Gt
mrsif
0
i,tm
0
t+1|st]−m0t ≥ 0 (18)
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Let us consider a portfolio process y as given by condition (R). At equilibrium
c, the first order conditions (12) on the financial securities are met. So, let i be
born at t, in state st; by linearity we get
E[mrsia
j
t+1yt|st]− qjt yt = 0, any j . (19)
where yt is the portfolio in s
t, which simply gives E[mrsiRt|st] = 1. UsingP
i∈Gt f
0
i,t = 1, taking a linear combination over all the agents born at t yields
E[
P
i∈Gt mrsif
0
i,t)Rt|st] = 1. Now since the shares f 0i,t are nonnegative, this
allows us to define a new transition probability from t to t + 1 with a density
with respect to the initial one equal to the function (
P
i∈Gt mrsif
0
i,t)Rt. It then
suﬃces to define the function φt as the reciprocal of πtτ=1Rτ−1. Under (R), φt
tends almost surely to zero, and the proof follows.
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